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Abstract—Use of formal methods is considered as a useful
and efﬁcient technique for the validation of security properties
of the protocols. In this paper, we analyze the protocols of
ISO/IEC 9798-2 entity authentication standard using a state-of-
the-art tool for automated analysis named AVISPA. Our analysis
of the standard using AVISPA’s OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends
shows that the two party protocols are secure against the speciﬁed
security properties while the back-ends are able to ﬁnd attacks
against unilateral and mutual authentication protocols involving
a trusted third party.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main goals of cryptography is entity authen-
tication. Entity authentication is the process of authenticat-
ing/verifying entity for what it claims to be. A lot of research
has been done and many authentication protocols have been
presented by many researchers. Lamport [1] presented one of
the earliest password-based entity authentication schemes in
1981. In Lamport’s scheme, password tables were stored on the
server and a compromise of the server lead to severe security
risks. Subsequently, many authentication schemes [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8] have been proposed to achieve better security
and efﬁciency.
Traditionally, a typical cycle has been followed for de-
signing security protocols. This cycle includes, specifying the
requirements of the protocol, designing the protocol according
to the given speciﬁcations, manual analysis of the protocol to
ﬁnd weaknesses, improving or redesigning the protocols by
removing the ﬂaws, then again analyzing the new protocol to
ﬁnd ﬂaws and so on. This approach has problems because
protocols are analyzed manually and manual analysis is slow,
tiresome and error prone. For example, Hwang et al. [9]
presented a two factor mutual authentication protocol but
Yoon et al. [10] analyzed their protocol and pointed that it
provides only unilateral authentication and is also vulnerable
to denial of service attack. Yoon et al. also came up with
an improved redesigned protocol. Later on, Chun-Ta Li et
al. [11] showed that improved scheme presented by Yoon et
al. is still unable to provide guard against denial of service
attack and it still provides only unilateral authentication. Later,
Kalsoom et al. [12] found that Chun-Ta Li’s improved protocol
is susceptible to impersonation attack if smart card is lost.
Therefore, the process of manually analyzing the protocols is
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not only time consuming but also costly once design errors are
found in a protocol after it has been deployed in a practical
setting.
Due to the above mentioned issues with manual design
and analysis of security protocols, research community started
working on formal analysis of security protocols. Two different
approaches have been used for automated designing/analysis
of security protocols:
– The ﬁrst approach is due to Abadi and Needham [13].
The idea is to use a design methodology which will
result in secure protocol design. They presented princi-
ples for better and secure design of security protocols.
Though the presented principles are not necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions for protocol correctness, they
provide an informal guideline to avoid many common
design errors.
– The second approach is to use systematic means for
analysis after the protocols are designed. The anal-
ysis contains either ﬁnding security ﬂaws in design
or proving correctness of certain security properties.
Under this approach, the most well-known instance
is due to Burrows et al. [14]. They presented logic
to analyze the security properties of protocols. Using
this strategy, they analyze protocols to answer ques-
tions about their correctness, output, assumptions and
whether they perform any irrelevant operations. They
deﬁne some logical postulates and rules of knowledge
and belief to analyze protocol and show effectiveness
of their logic by analyzing different protocols from the
existing literature.
Most of the modern automated protocol analysis tools
are based on model-checking techniques. The use of
model-checkers for security protocols became popular when
Lowe [15] used FDR model-checker to ﬁnd a security ﬂaw
in Needham-Schroeder public key protocol. Mur-phi [16] is
another model-checker designed for the automatic protocol
analysis where user has to specify the protocol and desired
security requirements using Mur-phi language. Then the pro-
tocol is searched against speciﬁed security requirements using
either depth-ﬁrst search or breadth-ﬁrst search strategy. Later,
Song et al. presented Athena [17] that was an extension of
the Strand Space Model where logic is integrated to specify
security properties and an automatic procedure is used for
the evaluation of well formed formulae. After the evaluation
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of formula, it provides a proof if formula is evaluated as
true and shows a counter example if formula is evaluated
as false. More recently, Cremers [18] presented one of the
state of the art freely available tools Scyther. It supports multi-
protocol analysis and analyzes inﬁnite number of sessions to
verify the correctness of protocols. The protocol is speciﬁed in
SPDL language. Later on, Basin and Cremers [19] performed
a formal analysis of ISO/IEC 9798 standard using Scyther
and found a number of weaknesses in some of the protocols
in the family. AVISPA [20], [21] is another modern tool for
automatic analysis of protocols which we have used to analyze
ISO/IEC 9798-2 authentication standard in this paper. AVISPA
is considered robust due to its modular approach and it is
capable of analyzing large industrial scale real world protocols.
The protocols are speciﬁed using HLPSL language.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives an overview of AVISPA tool. ISO/IEC 9798-2 authen-
tication standard is described in Section III. Formal analysis
of the standard using AVISPA is detailed in Section IV while
Section V summarises our conclusions.
II. THE AVISPA TOOL
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Proto-
cols and Applications) is a modern tool used for automated
falsiﬁcation of security protocols. Protocol falsiﬁcation and
protocol veriﬁcation differ in the fact that in falsiﬁcation, the
tool tries to detect attacks against the protocols being tested
whereas in veriﬁcation, the tool tries to prove the correctness
of the protocols being tested. AVISPA uses a special modelling
language named High Level Protocol Speciﬁcation Language
(HLPSL) to write speciﬁcations for security protocols. These
high level speciﬁcations written in HLPSL are translated to low
level Intermediate Format (IF) using an hlpsl2if translator. The
low level intermediate format code is then executed by one of
the four supported back-ends in order to ﬁnd any potential
security vulnerabilities in the protocols being analysed.
AVISPA is quite robust as it uses a modular approach
where the back-end tools are independent of the speciﬁcation
language. The approach is quite similar to that of Java where
the high level Java code is translated to low level byte-code
which is platform independent and can be executed on any
machine. Similarly, separation of back-end tools from the
speciﬁcation language gives the ﬂexibility to AVISPA that third
parties can develop their own back-ends as long as they follow
the intermediate format.
There are a number of tools in the market which provide
automated falsiﬁcation of security protocols but unfortunately
most of the tools work well only for small to medium sized
protocols. AVISPA, on the other hand, is capable of analysing
large industrial scale real world protocols. It includes a large
library of security protocols’ speciﬁcations collection contain-
ing many large protocols as well. The current library contains
33 protocols with 215 security properties (each security goal
potentially met by a protocol is treated as a separate problem
resulting in one protocol having multiple security problems).
The architecture of AVISPA tool is shown in Figure 1.
Currently, AVISPA supports four back-ends: OFMC, CL-AtSe,
SATMC and TA4SP. OFMC (On-the-Fly Model Checker)
considers both typed and untyped protocol models and carries
HLPSL
Translator
HLPSL2IF
Intermediate Format 
(IF)
Output
On-the-fly
Model-Checker
OFMC
CL-based
Attack Searcher
CL-AtSe
SAT-based
Model-Checker
SATMC
Tree-Automata-
based
Protocol Analyzer
TA4SP
Fig. 1: The AVISPA Architecture.
out on-the-ﬂy protocol falsiﬁcation and bounded veriﬁcation. It
uses lazy intruder technique for the creation of efﬁcient inﬁnite
state space models and incorporates symbolic techniques to
model Dolev-Yao intruder. CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logic-based
Attack Searcher) also works on typed and untyped protocol
models and performs protocol falsiﬁcation and bounded ver-
iﬁcation. It incorporates various optimization techniques to
reduce redundancies and uselessness in the protocol. SATMC
(SAT-based Model Checker) performs protocol falsiﬁcation
and bounded veriﬁcation for only typed protocol model.
SATMC works by reducing the security problem of a protocol
to satisﬁability of a propositional formula which is solved by
state-of-the-art SAT solvers. Lastly, TA4SP (Tree Automata
based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Se-
curity Protocols) is used for the unbounded veriﬁcation of
security properties of the protocol. It uses rewriting rules to
represent protocol and intruders abilities and tree language
is used to map the intruder’s knowledge and instances of
sessions. Then set of reachable terms is computed from the
tree automaton language using rewriting rules.
A. High Level Protocol Speciﬁcation Language
HLPSL is a high level language used to specify the
protocols and their security properties in AVISPA. HLPSL is
a role-based language where each participant is represented as
a role. There are two types of roles; basic roles and composed
roles. A basic role shows the actions of a single participant
during the execution of a protocol or a sub-protocol while a
composed role combines two or more basic roles to execute
them together. The deﬁnition of a basic role represents the
initial knowledge, initial state and the transitions of that role.
The general structure to deﬁne a basic role is given below.
role name_of_the_role (arguments)
played_by role_identifier
def=
local
State: type,
..
..
init
State:=initial_value
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..
..
transition
..
.. ‘
end role
where arguments is the list of arguments showing the initial
knowledge of the role, local is a keyword under which local
variables of the role are deﬁned, and under init section, the
local variables are initialized. Under transition section, role
transitions in terms of state changes are deﬁned. The syntax
of composed roles is quite similar to that of basic roles. The
only difference is presence of composition section in composed
roles instead of basic roles’ transition section.
After roles deﬁnitions, another important part of HLPSL is
declaration of goals. In goal section, security properties are
speciﬁed against which the protocol is analyzed. If any of
the goals is violated, the AVISPA back-ends report an attack
against the protocol along with a complete trace of that attack.
There are two types of security properties (goals) which can
directly be speciﬁed using HLPSL. The conﬁdentiality goal(s)
are speciﬁed using the keyword secrecy of while authentica-
tion goal(s) use authentication on keyword. A sample goal
section is given below.
goal
secrecy_of k
authentication_on alice_bob_na
end goal
After specifying the roles and declaring the goals, the
last thing is to execute the code by calling the highest level
composite role environment.
III. ISO/IEC 9798-2
ISO-IEC 9798 is a set of protocol families produced
by joint technical committee of ISO and IEC for entity
authentication. ISO-IEC 9798 consists of 6 parts. ISO-IEC
9798-1 presents an authentication model as well as general
requirements and constraints for entity authentication. ISO-
IEC 9798-2 to ISO-IEC 9798-5 provide speciﬁc mechanisms
for entity authentication using symmetric encipherment, digital
signatures, cryptographic check functions and zero knowledge
techniques, respectively. The last part, ISO-IEC 9798-6, deals
with manual techniques for data transfer between authenticat-
ing devices.
In this paper, we formally analyse part 2 of ISO-IEC
9798 standard [22] namely mechanisms using symmetric en-
cipherment algorithms. AVISPA tool [20], [21] is used to
analyse these protocols. ISO-IEC 9798-2 contains 6 different
mechanisms for entity authentication. First two mechanisms
provide unilateral authentication in a two-party setting, next
two provide mutual authentication in a two-party setting while
mechanisms ﬁve and six provide mutual authentication (or
unilateral authentication by omitting a couple of steps) in a
three-party setting involving an additional trusted third party.
Before describing these mechanisms, we want to make
two remarks regarding our speciﬁcations and analysis of these
mechanisms.
Notation Meaning
Kab Symmetric key shared between Alice and Bob
Kat Symmetric key shared between Alice and trusted third party
Kbt Symmetric key shared between Bob and trusted third party
Na Sequence number or time stamp generated by Alice
Nb Sequence number or time stamp generated by Bob
Nt Sequence number or time stamp generated by trusted third party
A Identiﬁcation of Alice
B Identiﬁcation of Bob
EKab (X) Encipherment of X using the symmetric key Kab
X||Y Concatenation of strings X and Y
TABLE I: Notations used in this paper to describe ISO/IEC
9798-2 standard
– Different mechanisms in 9798-2 use some optional
text ﬁelds. We have ignored these ﬁelds and not used
these in our analysis.
– As mentioned earlier, there are two mechanisms for
unilateral authentication in two-party setting. The ﬁrst
mechanism is a one-pass authentication mechanism
which uses sequence numbers or time stamps in order
to provide security against replay attacks. To avoid
the same attack, the second mechanism uses random
numbers in a challenge-response style requiring two
messages to be passed for unilateral authentication.
Similarly, for mutual authentication (in two-party as
well as three-party setting), one additional message
is passed when using random numbers as compared
to the use of sequence numbers or time stamps. In
our analysis, we consider only those mechanisms that
involve sequence number/time stamp to avoid replay
attack and we model these sequence numbers/time
stamps as nonce data types in our HLPSL speciﬁca-
tions. Therefore, this paper models and analyses four
protocols in ISO-IEC 9798-2.
In the following sections, we describe these mechanisms
one by one. The notations we have used to denote different
elements are shown in Table I.
A. Mechanisms Not Involving a Trusted Third Party
This scenario involves Alice and Bob who share a symmet-
ric key in advance. In ﬁrst mechanism, Alice is authenticated
by Bob while in the second mechanism, both Alice and Bob
authenticate each other.
Alice (A) Bob (B)
EKab(Na||B) 
Fig. 2: Message passed between Alice and Bob for unilateral
authentication
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1) Unilateral Authentication: In unilateral authentica-
tion mechanism described in ISO-IEC 9798-2 standard, the
claimant Alice initiates the communication sending a single
message to the veriﬁer Bob who authenticates Alice. The
following steps are involved.
– Alice sends the value EKab(Na||B) to Bob.
– Upon receiving the message, Bob decrypts
EKab(Na||B) and checks the correctness of identiﬁer
B and the nonce Na.
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of unilateral
authentication mechanism.
Alice (A) Bob (B)
EKab(Na||B) 
EKab(Nb||A)ﬀ
Fig. 3: Messages passed between Alice and Bob for mutual
authentication
2) Mutual Authentication: In mutual authentication mech-
anism, Alice initiates the communication sending the ﬁrst
message to Bob who authenticates Alice. Next, Bob sends a
message back to Alice who authenticates Bob. The following
steps are involved.
– Alice sends the value EKab(Na||B) to Bob.
– Upon receiving the message, Bob decrypts
EKab(Na||B) and checks the correctness of identiﬁer
B and the nonce Na.
– Bob sends the value EKab(Nb||A) to Alice.
– Upon receiving the message, Alice decrypts
EKab(Nb||A) and checks the correctness of identiﬁer
A and the nonce Nb.
Mutual authentication mechanism in ISO/IEC 9798-2 is
graphically represented in Figure 3.
B. Mechanisms Involving a Trusted Third Party
In this scenario, Alice and Bob do not share any symmetric
key among themselves in advance. Instead, both share symmet-
ric keys with the trusted third party. The symmetric session
key Kab to be shared between Alice and Bob is generated by
trusted third party (TTP) and is sent to Alice and Bob in a
digital envelope.
1) Unilateral Authentication: In three-party unilateral au-
thentication mechanism, the claimant Alice initiates the com-
munication with trusted third party. Alice, in turn, receives an
encrypted message from TTP, compiles a new message using
the message received from TTP and send this new message to
Bob. Bob authenticates Alice using the received message. The
following steps are involved.
– Alice sends the value Na1||B to TTP where Na1 is a
nonce generated by Alice.
– TTP sends the value EKat(Na1||Kab||B)||
EKbt(Nt||Kab||A) to Alice.
– Upon receiving the message, Alice decrypts the ﬁrst
part of the received message, i.e., EKat(Na1||Kab||B),
checks the correctness of identiﬁer B, veriﬁes that
the nonce Na1 corresponds to the one sent to TTP
in the ﬁrst message and retrieves the key Kab. She
also extracts the second part of the received message
containing the digital envelope.
– Alice sends the message EKbt(Nt||Kab||A)||
EKab(Na2||B) to Bob.
– Upon receiving the message EKbt(Nt||Kab||A)||
EKab(Na2||B), Bob decrypts the message, retrieves
the secret key Kab and veriﬁes the correctness of
identiﬁers A and B along with the nonces Nt and
Na2.
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of unilateral
authentication mechanism involving a trusted third party.
2) Mutual Authentication: In ISO/IEC 9798-2 standard,
three-party mutual authentication mechanism is based on three-
party unilateral authentication mechanism. In mutual authen-
tication, the ﬁrst three messages to be passed are identical
to unilateral authentication version. There is one additional
message sent by Bob to Alice as shown in Figure 5. The
additional steps to the unilateral authentication mechanism are
the following.
– Bob sends the value EKab(Nb||A) to Alice.
– Upon receiving the message, Alice decrypts it and
checks the correctness of identiﬁer A and the nonce
Nb.
IV. FORMAL ANALYSIS USING AVISPA
As stated earlier, we have analysed four protocols of ISO-
IEC 9798-2 standard. We used OFMC and CL-AtSe model
analysers for analysis of each protocol. The ﬁrst 2 protocols
(i.e., the ones without TTP) were declared secure by both
OFMC and CL-AtSe. On the other hand, both OFMC and
CL-AtSe found attacks against the last two protocols (the
ones with TTP). As detected attacks against both protocols are
quite similar, here we provide details related to one of those
protocols namely unilateral authentication protocol involving
a trusted third party (Figure 4). Our speciﬁcation for this
protocol contains 3 roles namely alice, bob and thirdparty.
An excerpt from our HLPSL code containing the role alice is
shown below:
role alice(
A,B,TTP : agent,
Kat : symmetric_key,
ST,RT,SB,RB : channel(dy))
played_by A
def=
local
State : nat,
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Alice (A) Bob (B) Trusted 3rd Party (TTP )
Na1||B 
EKat(Na1||Kab||B)||EKbt(Nt||Kab||A)ﬀ
EKbt(Nt||Kab||A)||EKab(Na2||B)
Fig. 4: Messages passed for unilateral authentication of Alice to Bob involving a TTP
Alice (A) Bob (B) Trusted 3rd Party (TTP )
Na1||B 
EKat(Na1||Kab||B)||EKbt(Nt||Kab||A)ﬀ
EKbt(Nt||Kab||A)||EKab(Na2||B)
EKab(Nb||A)ﬀ
Fig. 5: Messages passed for mutual authentication of Alice and Bob involving a TTP
K,Kbt : symmetric_key,
Na1,Na2,Nt: text,
X: {text.symmetric_key.agent}_symmetric_key
init
State := 10
transition
1. State = 10 /\ RB(start) =|>
State’:= 11 /\ Na1’:= new()
/\ ST(Na1’.B)
2. State = 11
/\ RT({Na1.K’.B}_Kat.X’) =|>
State’:= 12 /\ Na2’ := new()
/\ SB(X’.{Na2’.B}_K’)
/\ witness(A,B,bob_alice_na2,Na2’)
/\ request(A,TTP,alice_ttp_na1,Na1)
end role
In addition to correct speciﬁcation of roles, true identi-
ﬁcation of security goals is also very important in order to
achieve reliable analysis of any security protocol. For unilateral
authentication involving TTP, we identiﬁed and used 3 security
goals and analysed the protocol against these speciﬁed goals.
The goal section of our HLPSL speciﬁcation is copied below:
goal
secrecy_of k
authentication_on bob_alice_na2
authentication_on alice_ttp_na1
end goal
Two of the security goals are related to authentication
while one is related to secrecy. The goal “secrecy of k” is
related to the secrecy of symmetric session key generated
by the trusted third party and to be used by Alice and Bob
for their communication. The second goal “authentication on
bob alice na2” is for authentication of Alice by Bob while
the third goal “authentication on alice ttp na1” is related to
authentication of TTP by Alice.
For protocol analysis using AVISPA, an important consid-
eration is the number of parallel sessions to be run among
different protocol participants. Below is an excerpt from our
HLPSL code which contains the environment role.
role environment()
def=
const
bob_alice_na2, alice_ttp_na1,
k : protocol_id,
kat,kbt,kit : symmetric_key,
a,b,t,i : agent
intruder_knowledge = {a,b,t,i,kit}
composition
session(a,b,t,kat,kbt)
/\ session(a,i,t,kat,kit)
/\ session(i,b,t,kit,kbt)
/\ session(a,b,i,kat,kbt)
end role
In environment role above, four parallel sessions are shown.
The ﬁrst one is a protocol run among honest parties namely
Alice, Bob and TTP while in other three sessions, the intruder
masquerades as Bob, Alice and TTP, respectively.
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When we analysed our speciﬁcation against the speciﬁed
goals using OFMC and CL-AtSe, both these AVISPA back-
ends showed that the protocol is unsafe. The detected attack
is an impersonation attack where the intruder tricks Bob into
believing that the last message of the protocol (Figure 4) is
coming from Alice. The intruder creates this last message
by concatenating two message parts. The ﬁrst part is the one
which was earlier sent by the TTP to Alice and which is now
replayed by the intruder. The second part of the message is
the legitimate one which was sent by Alice intended for Bob.
Figure 6 shows a Message Sequence Chart (MSC) of the attack
detected using OFMC back end. The MSC is generated by
using SPAN [23] which is a freely available protocol animation
tool for AVISPA.
Fig. 6: An MSC of the replay attack detected by AVISPA
against ISO/IEC 9798-2 unilateral authentication involving
TTP. The attack is detected by OFMC back end and the MSC
is generated by using the SPAN tool.
In step 6 of Figure 6, Bob (b-4) is not able to detect the
modiﬁcations made by the intruder in the message coming
from Alice and he is tricked to believe that the message he
receives is coming unmodiﬁed from Alice. This violates one
of the authentications goals (authentication on bob alice na2)
mentioned in the goal section of our HLPSL speciﬁcation.
Some explaination of this attack corresponding to MSC in
Figure 6 goes as follows:
Step 1. Alice wants to initiate a session with Bob and sends
a message containing Bob’s identity and a nonce to
the TTP.
Step 2. The intruder views the message and passes it to the
TTP.
Step 3. The TTP replies with a message containing two parts,
one intended for Alice and the other for Bob both
containing the sessions key sk-2 in a digital envelope.
Step 4. The intruder intercepts the message, sends the part
intended for Alice as it is but replaces the other part
by any random string. As the part for Bob was en-
crypted using the shared secret key between the TTP
and Bob, Alice has no way to differentiate between
the legitimate encrypted value and the random string.
Step 5. Upon receiving the message, Alice decrypts the ﬁrst
part of the received message to retrieve the key sk-2
and prepares an encrypted message for Bob using
sk-2. She also extracts the other part of received mes-
sage and concatenates it with the before-mentioned
encrypted message and sends it to Bob.
Step 6. The intruder intercepts the message sent by Alice and
constitutes a new message by concatenating part of
two messages, one which was sent by the TTP in
step 3 and the other which was sent by Alice in step
5. The intruder sends this new message to Bob. Bob
receives the message, decrypts ﬁrst part using Kbt to
get sk-2 and decrypt second part using sk-2 to get
nonce-4 and b. Now Bob believes that he is talking
to Alice and that they both agree on key sk-2 for
communications. This is clearly a violation of the
unilateral authentication guarantee of the protocol.
When the same protocol was analysed using CL-Atse back
end, a similar attack against authentication goal was detected.
Though the attack detected by CL-Atse is more complex
and involves more steps as compared to the one detected by
OFMC, the overall violation is the same. The MSC of the
attack found by CL-Atse is shown in Figure 7. The message
received by Bob (b-4) in step 10 is constituted by the intruder
by combining parts from two earlier messages sent by the
TTP and Alice in steps 7 and 9, respectively. Bob is not able
to detect this modiﬁcation and believes that he is receiving
the message from Alice. Note that as mutual authentication
involving TTP protocol (Figure 5) is an extension of unilateral
authentication protocol (Figure 4) with one additional message,
the above-mentioned attack is also applicable against mutual
authentication protocol.
Fig. 7: An MSC of the attack detected by CL-AtSe back end
of AVISPA against ISO/IEC 9798-2 unilateral authentication
involving TTP.
In terms of efﬁciency, CL-AtSe is much faster than OFMC
in all cases. The time consumed by these sub-tools is tabulated
in Table II. The time is computed on an Intel Core i3
processor with 3 GB of RAM and running Microsoft Windows
7 Professional with Service Pack 1.
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Not Involving TTP Involving TTP
Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual
OFMC 0.01 0.04 0.22 0.28
CL-ATSE 0 0.01 0.02 0.03
TABLE II: Running Time (in seconds) for ISO-IEC 9798-2
protocols using OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have performed formal analysis of
ISO/IES 9798-2 entity authentication standard using AVISPA
tool. We used OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends for automated
security analysis. Both back-ends found attacks against unilat-
eral and mutual authentication protocols involving a trusted
third party. In terms of efﬁciency, we found that CL-AtSe
was more efﬁcient in analyzing the protocols as compared to
OFMC.
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